Interview by Yury Nersesov for APN Northwest
March 17: Fighting has been going on in “hot spots” of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia for a quarter-century, but little is known about the participation of Communist divisions. If the Russian, Ukrainian and European nationalists sent groups of volunteers across the arc of fire from the former Yugoslavia and Transnistria to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the left never seemed to come out of hibernation. Only at the end of last year, among the militia groups of the Lugansk People’s Republic, did the first communist group appear, now fighting in the Ghost Brigade of Alexei Mozgovoi. We met the squad’s political commissar Alexey Markov (known in social networks by the nicknames redrat and trueredrat, and in the Donbass by the call sign Good) at the funeral of Evgeny Pavlenko (call sign Taimyr), a National Bolshevik from St. Petersburg who died in Debaltsevo on February 8.
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| Alexey Markov |
Which of the Communist Parties formed your squad?
None. The vast majority of our fighters are non-partisan, or are not members of the “official” Communist Party. Evgeny was in Other Russia, and Vsevolod Petrovsky, who was killed along with him, was in the Ukrainian left group Borotba. I was a member of the Communist Party, then left, but maintained relationships and cooperation with many party members. Together with lawyer Dmitry Agranovskaya, I participated in the campaign in defense Sergey Arakcheev. I was very surprised that there were no communist units, but nobody took it upon themselves. Commander Pyotr Biryukov and I did, with the benefit of his military experience — he was an officer who fought in Abkhazia and Transnistria.
And were you there before?
I was going to leave the Donbass in the spring, but was asked to stay. They asked that I obtain flak jackets, helmets and other equipment. It reached the detachment on November 6, and the next day Pyotr Arkadyevitch [Biryukov] moved this equipment across the border. Initially we were based in Alchevsk, then part of the group moved to the village with the most appropriate name for us, Komissarovka. We were in a period of calm, and therefore able to prepare. We carried out military exercises, combat shooting, a shooting gallery, equipped in January after the first battles, even held competitions, attended by teams from ten units, and our Head of Communications won …
And of course many reconnaissance missions and raids on enemy locations helped us to gain experience. We defended ourselves successfully. Once we were able to drive a group into a minefield, afterward driving back their rescuers. Evgeny’s first battle was memorable — frankly, at first I doubted him: He had not served in the military, not fought, and was trained in the most peaceful profession — a school teacher … But he carried himself very well, and that day we were able to detect a mobile mortar, then the Artillery Battalion destroyed it. During all the cold months before the final offensive against Debaltsevo, we lost only two people: one died from disease, the second in an accident.
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| Pyotr Biryukov |
Were the losses in Debaltsevo higher?
During the storming of the city, we did not have any casualties, although in general the offensive launched Jan. 21 to capture the Debaltsevo cauldron cost the militia dearly. Primarily this was due to ill-conceived head-on attacks, first at Svetlodarsk (we specifically did not attack), then at Debaltsevo and the surrounding fortified settlements. It is clear that, when moving rapidly towards enemy positions and attacking from a distance of five kilometers, many will be killed. We acted differently, moving gradually and adjusting to the terrain, and reducing the range to 1000-1200 meters.
On the night of February 13, three reconnaissance groups (not ours) entered Debaltsevo without any resistance, they were not noticed. In the morning infantry from Ghost started to move in, on the second day Mozgovoi appointed Pyotr Arkadyevitch commander of all units in the city, later we lent the August Tank Battalion a couple of cars, and by the end of the operation we quickly cleared two districts, “March 8” and Novogrigorovku. Two dozen corpses were left at the Ukrainian positions. We captured two tanks, six BMP, 3 “Ural”, “Shishiga” (GAZ-66), two ZU-23 … Another Ukrainian flag taken was signed by representatives of the battalions of the 128th Brigade.
Based on the results of the operation, I can say that the regular units of the Ukrainian army fight without much enthusiasm, even in self-defense. Their best section is artillery. If they detect movement in an open area, they not only manage to attack, but also target the “green cover” in the area, where people usually run to escape. We suffered major losses from their artillery fire, in a clash on February 8 that killed three men, including Evgeny. These guys gave cover to the scouts, then helped bring in the wounded, and they were blanketed with several targeted volleys. It’s a shame, of course: Debaltsevo was taken without them and they were just three wonderful boys … We already had great plans for Evgeny: he was going to become a platoon commander.
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Speech at the funeral of Evgeny Pavlenko in St. Petersburg (transcript and video of the ceremony here)
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And will your squad become a company or battalion?
Hard to say. We originally formed as a purely infantry unit, but we now have our own scouts, sappers, Mortar Battery and medical team, and only about 60 people. If you look at the official schedule of the Russian army, it is a reinforced platoon. In the battles for Debaltsevo, together with reinforcements who guided us to the shooting, more than 200 fighters were involved, strengthened by our company. Therefore it is considered a separate detachment of “Ghost” with special staffing, because the Brigade has still not joined the armed forces of the Lugansk People’s Republic.
Because they wanted to disband Ghost and disperse it into other units, while Mozgovoi was only prepared to enter as a single brigade?
That’s right. After that, he we accused of warlordism and plotting a coup, but in fact it is a purely practical consideration. It has long been known: groups of fighters trained together fight better than those jumbled together from different units, they are more successful in their work and suffer smaller losses. It is logical that Alexei Borisovich did not want the brigade broken up, and he paid for it. Since September, Ghost was cut off from supplies of weapons, equipment and ammunition and had to get everything it needed by personal contact or barter. With the assistance of Russian supporters of Novorossiya, the Communist Party got us a truck — very cool, it helps us.
Oh, and the supply of arms and ammunition resumed just before the storming of Debaltsevo. It became clear: to disarm the most combat-ready brigade before the onset of battle was absolutely silly. I believe that our squad worked well with what we received, and our red flag over the liberated city is evidence of that.
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| Portraits of the fallen fighters hold the most prominent place in the unit’s headquarters. |
Translated by Greg Butterfield



